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Ideational Populism in Chile? A Case Study 
 
For some time, the word populism has been circulating like a debased currency in the political 
marketplace. Politicians with a wide range of convictions and practices have strived to dissociate 
from the label and detach it from their actions. Scholars, conversely, have not hesitated to use 
it—outright and with qualifying adjectives—despite the ambiguity that surrounds it. Readers 
with keen eyes will notice our appropriation of the beginning lines of Schmitter and Karl’s 
(1991) classic, “What Democracy is…and is not.”  
Like democracy, populism “is a word whose meaning we must discern if it is to be of any use 
in guiding political analysis and practice” (Schmitter and Karl 1991: 75). The conceptual work 
on democracy Schmitter and Karl catalyzed has had salutary demonstration effects for scholars 
of populism. Indeed, lively debates have encouraged a plowing, and some winnowing, of the 
semantic field since Mudde (2004) identified a “populist Zeitgeist” (e.g., Aslanidis 2016; 
Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2009; Hawkins 2009; Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 
forthcominga; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, 2017; Ostiguy 2009). In this same spirit, this 
study tests some behavioral implications of the ideational definition of populism (Hawkins and 
Rovira Kaltwasser forthcomingb) with an experimental design in a most-likely case. Our results 
are inconsistent with predictions of the theory of ideational populism. To advance the ongoing 
theoretical debate, we reflect on which elements of our case might account for the slippage 
between expectations and empirics. 
We proceed as follows. First, we describe the ideational definition and theory of populism. 
Next we discuss former Chilean presidential candidate, Roxana Miranda, as a most-likely case 
for ideational populism. Then we present our experimental design. After reporting the (null) 
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results, we conclude with reflections on what this failure can (and cannot) tell us about the 
validity of ideational populism. 
Ideational Populism: Definition and Theory  
There is no “right” way to define populism. But some definitions are more amenable to the 
creation and testing of causal theories than others. As an overview let us consider, drawing on 
Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (forthcominga), four main classes of definitions: structuralist, 
economic, political-institutional, and ideational. In broad strokes, structuralists view populism as 
a regime in which a strong leader, backed by a diverse social base, implements a statist 
development model (Cardoso and Faletto 1969; Germani 1978; Oxhorn 1998). Economic 
populism distinguishes policy bundles that seek short-term growth and redistribution at the risk 
of inflation and debt and, thus, long-term stability (e.g., Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin 2013; 
Dornbusch and Edwards 1991). Political-institutional populism amounts to a strategy personalist 
leaders pursue to gain or to wield power via “direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support 
from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers” (Weyland 2001, 14). The main drawback 
of these definitions, for our purposes, is that they overlook the micro-foundations by which 
individuals come to embrace populist leaders. Ideational populism does not, making it more 
suitable to our research question. 
At its core, ideational populism is a “political discourse that posits a cosmic struggle between 
a reified ‘will of the people’ and a conspiring elite” (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 
forthcominga: 2). It is, thus, born of three necessary and sufficient conditions: “a) the 
proclamation of ‘the people’ as a homogenous and virtuous community; b) the depiction of ‘the 
elite’ as a corrupt and self-serving entity; and c) the defense of popular sovereignty at any cost” 
(Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser forthcominga: 2). Viewed in this light, ideational populism can 
Page 2 of 47Swiss Political Science Review
3 
 
be juxtaposed with other discursive frameworks such as pluralism (a rejection of a Manichaean 
outlook and a refusal to vilify political opponents) and elitism (a celebration of the elite’s virtues 
and emphasis on the masses’ fallibility) (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser forthcominga: 2). 
Furthermore, conceptions of populism as a discourse (Laclau 2005) and as a “thin-centered” 
ideology (Mudde 2004) can be subsumed under the ideational banner since all three agree that it 
differs from a thick ideology “in that it is not the product of conscious elaborations and tends to 
have low programmatic scope” (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser forthcominga: 4). 
Building on this conceptual foundation, Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (forthcominga) 
articulate a theory of ideational populism by which populist actors take advantage of crisis 
conditions to frame issues in ways that activate populist attitudes in the populace and, thus, 
generate broad electoral support. To explore the theory in greater detail, we begin by 
conceptualizing populist attitudes.  
An ideational theory of populism must grapple with why voters support populist leaders. To 
that end, Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (forthcominga) posit populism is a latent disposition. 
Unlike many political attitudes and common personality traits, which remain fairly constant, 
populist dispositions are dormant until specific linguistic frames and political contexts activate 
them. Evidence suggests a great deal of latent demand for populism across Europe and the 
Americas (Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2014; Elchardus and Spruyt 2016; Hawkins, Riding, 
and Mudde 2012; Andreadis et al. forthcoming; van Hauwaert, Schimpf and Azevedo 
forthcoming). Yet without the other theoretical elements – context, framing, and mobilization – 
populist demand remains inactive or goes unmet. 
According to Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (forthcominga), failures of democratic 
representation create contexts in which populist messages resonate with voters. Rife corruption 
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and/or unresponsive elected officials make conditions particularly ripe for ideational populism. 
Systematic corruption – the use of public office for private gain – suggests a series of 
institutional problems that normal processes, headed by establishment politicians, are unwilling 
or unable to fix. Lack of responsiveness can result from traditional actors responding to the 
exigencies of pursuing economic and political development in an increasingly globalized world, 
or electoral rules that entrench traditional parties. In the former case, the loss of autonomy leaves 
traditional politicians vulnerable to criticism from groups on the losing ends of globalization 
(Spruyt, Keppens and Van Droogenbroeck 2016). In the latter case, because electoral rule 
insulate elites from voter demands, they lose their popular bases and pave the way for populist 
leaders (Morgan 2011). Both problems run contrary to the ideal of popular sovereignty. 
Failures of democratic representation alone will not create populism. Rather, would-be 
populist political entrepreneurs must use a strong discourse to frame the problems as an elite 
conspiracy against the will of the people more convincingly than under normal circumstances. 
Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (forthcominga) theorize that successful populist discourse 
employs three powerful communication frames. First, populist discourse must blame failures of 
representation on the establishment elite’s intentional behaviors and actions not as 
epiphenomenal or situational. Second, populist rhetoric frames problems as a struggle between 
an in-group and an out-group with particular identities: the people – regular citizens constituting 
a majority – and elites – a ruling minority viewed in contradistinction to the people. A third 
rhetorical trademark of populism is the use of emotional triggers such as fear and anger. Anger 
especially motivates individuals to assign blame to someone or some group and to try to punish 
or scapegoat them (Abelson 1995; Keltner, Ellsworth, and Edwards 1993). All three frames 
Page 4 of 47Swiss Political Science Review
5 
 
should, theoretically, activate populist attitudes to propel citizens to overcome basic collective 
action problems all political forces confront.  
 
Case Selection 
As an entry point to the ideational theory described above, we explore voters’ reactions to a 
populist candidate in a most-likely case: Chile’s 2013 presidential contender, Roxana Miranda. 
Miranda and her party, Partido Igualdad, regularly railed against the failures of entrenched 
political elites who, she contended, had long governed in their own self-interest rather than in the 
interest of working-class Chileans. As president, Miranda vowed to change the electoral rules to 
benefit “the people” who, at present, are “slaves” to an oppressive, elite-captured system. This 
decades-old arrangement has, she claimed, entrenched unchecked capitalism which has deepened 
social inequalities. Partido Igualdad’s slogan for the 2013 campaign was, “Let the people 
command! (¡Que el pueblo mande!).” As of this writing, the phrase “Nobody has ever asked 
permission to change history” (Nunca se ha pedido permiso para cambiar la historia) appears 
three times on the homepage of Partido Igualdad’s website. Thus, her political discourse 
contained all the markers of ideational populist discourse theorized above: elites intentionally 
taking advantage of electoral rules and prompting a crisis of representation; a contrast of elites 
versus the people; and the use of emotions, particularly anger and outrage in her rhetoric.  
Labeling Roxana Miranda a “populist” is also valid according to Hawkins and Castanho 
Silva’s (2016) holistic scoring of populist rhetoric across 101 party leaders/presidential 
candidates and 126 party manifestos in 26 countries Western Europe and the Americas from 
2010 to 2013. The two of Miranda’s speeches they sampled – one at the beginning of the 2013 
campaign and one at the end of it – rate as more populist than of any other candidate in the 
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sample, including Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Ecuador’s Rafael Correa, Bolivia’s Evo Morales, 
Hungary’s Viktor Orban, France’s Marine Le Pen, Italy’s Beppe Grillo, etc. Using the same 
measurement technique, Partido Igualad’s party manifesto scores as the most populist manifesto 
in the sample. In other words, it espouses more ideational populism than Venezuela’s PSUV, 
Ecuador’s Alianza PAIS, Bolivia’s MAS, the Dutch PVV, Germany’s Die Linke, the British 
National Party, France’s Front National, etc. In sum, we are confident that both Roxana Miranda 
and the party backing her in 2013 employed a political communication style that qualifies as 
ideational populist. 
To claim any validity beyond our sample to the rest of the electorate, we must be able to 
assert with some confidence that Chilean voters would have been exposed to her populist 
messages. To that end, we note that Miranda participated in the franja política, a series of state-
sponsored television advertising slots allocated in equal measure to all presidential candidates in 
the 28 days leading up to the election. In 2013 these ad spots lasted 2 minutes and 10 seconds. 
Additionally, Miranda took part in all major televised presidential candidate debates and was a 
guest on popular television and radio political talk shows. Thus, we can safely assume that the 
electorate was aware of Roxana Miranda’s populist discourse. 
Although Miranda arguably succeeded in broadcasting her populist message, by the metric of 
votes Miranda failed to convince many Chileans, garnering only 1.24% of the valid votes. Nor 
was there an obvious failure of representation at the time of the 2013 elections. Despite the fact 
that incumbent president, Sebastián Piñera, was not extremely popular, a large majority voted in 
the first round of the 2013 presidential contest for one of two establishment female candidates: 
Michelle Bachelet (left-wing coalition) and Evelyn Matthei (right-wing coalition). Matthei was a 
long-time senator and leader within the Unión Democrática Independiente party. Her opponent, 
Page 6 of 47Swiss Political Science Review
7 
 
Bachelet, had previously served a term as president from 2006 to 2010, and resoundingly won 
the second round of the ballotage. Beyond the continued electoral strength of traditional 
candidates, most major international studies of governance, corruption, and rule of law in the 
post-authoritarian era concluded that Chile was a model of clean government. Therefore, the 
2013 Chilean election itself lacked the contextual conditions for populist discourse to be 
persuasive. Perhaps this explains Miranda’s poor showing. 
The political atmosphere in which we fielded our study, however, was far more toxic. In 
January 2015, political elites from across the political spectrum and within the governing 
coalition were implicated in a series of campaign finance and influence trafficking scandals. If 
we want to argue that this context constituted a crisis of representation strong enough to open the 
door for a populist leader, we need to substantiate the claim that these scandals damaged political 
elites in the public eye and were widely known to the public. To do so we will consider evidence 
from public opinion surveys and internet search activity.  
Let us first examine public opinion trends from the semi-annual polls conducted by the 
Centro de Estudios Públicos. These high-quality surveys are unrivaled in their impact on elite 
behavior and broader mass opinion of the state of Chilean politics. Below we analyze two polls 
that straddle the rash of scandals – one fielded in November 2014 and the other in April 2015. 
The latter conveniently overlapped the field dates of our study. Results are in Figure 1; sampling 
error for both surveys is +/– 3% at the 95% confidence level. 
Here we observe striking, presumably, intervention effects of the scandals on political trust, 
perceptions of corruption, and overall public mood. Across the two time points, trust in 
government dropped from 32% to 17%, and trust in political parties was halved from an abysmal 
6% to a nadir of 3%. Figure 1 depicts some additional comparisons. The proportion of Chileans 
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citing corruption as one of the top three problems which the government should address more 
than tripled from less than one in ten in November 2014 to more than one in four in April 2015.
1
 
In a related way, Chileans’ opinions about the extent of corruption changed markedly.
2
 
Before the scandal, the gap between those who felt corruption was widespread, as opposed to 
fairly localized, was +9. Afterwards, the gap widened to +30 (63% – 33%). Lastly, public mood 
tanked.
3
 The percentage of Chileans who felt the country was progressing fell by 15 points from 
31% to 16%, while feelings of stagnation and decay rose 11 and 5 points, respectively. Of all the 
differences reported here, only the last fails to achieve statistical significance at the 95% level.  
[Figure 1 here] 
While just two time points are used for brevity, the longer time series does not reveal any 
obvious secular trends that could account for these shifts. Yet the conduct of science warrants 
skepticism in the absence of a rigorous model or complementary evidence. The former is beyond 
the scope of this paper, but we can bring more evidence in support of our claim that these trends 
owe to a widespread awareness of political scandals among the Chilean public.  
How much attention did the public pay to the scandals? We leverage search activity on 
www.google.cl via Google Trends and Google Correlate to gauge relative attention to the 
scandals and their antagonists. Specifically, normalized search activity can serve as an indicator 
of how much more interest the actors and institutions involved received during the scandals 
compared to the amount of attention they normally receive, i.e. on average. For perspective, 
                                                           
1
 “¿Cuáles son los tres problemas a los que debería dedicar el mayor esfuerzo en solucionar el 
Gobierno? Corrupción.” 
2
  “¿Qué tan extendida piensa usted que está la corrupción en el servicio público de Chile? Casi nadie 
está involucrado; un pequeño número de personas están involucradas; un número moderado de personas 
están involucradas; mucha gente está involucrada; casi todas las personas están involucradas.” 
3
  “¿Ud. cree que en el momento actual Chile está: Progresando, Estancado o En decadencia?” 
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consider examples from two major sporting events that we would expect to garner relatively 
more interest from the Chilean public in a specific period compared to their historical monthly 
average. First, Chile advanced past the group stage in the 2014 soccer World Cup Championship 
only to be disqualified in the Round of 16 by the hosts, Brazil. Searches on www.google.cl for 
World Cup terms “copa mundial” and “copa del mundo” soared by 15.5 and 13.5 standard 
deviations, respectively, during the tournament. Second, when Chile won the 2015 Americas 
Cup, search activity on www.google.cl for “copa américa” rose about 12 standard deviations. 
With these baselines, let us consider the Chilean public’s appetite for information on political 
scandals. 
In late October of 2014, a large holding company called Penta came under investigation for 
illegally subsidizing political candidates using over 250 fake invoices for services and value-
added tax receipts. On February 24, 2015 the case was taken over by, Sabas Chauán, marking the 
first time in Chilean history an Attorney General personally led a criminal investigation. 
Normalized search activity for “penta” increased 17 standard deviations over its historic mean in 
the week of February 22 to March 1. A similar case of illegal campaign finance was brought 
against the lithium mining company, Soquimich (SQM). Making the case extra salacious, SQM’s 
principal stock holder, Julio Ponce Lerou, is ex-dictator Augusto Pinochet’s son-in-law. 
Normalized search activity for “soquimich” increased 13 standard deviations at the crest of legal 
proceedings in March 2015. Though Ponce Lerou was not formally charged, Google Correlate 
shows a strong association (0.71) between the search terms “ponce lerou” and “soquimich” in 
early 2015 (January 4 to April 19). Search activity for “ponce lerou” stayed elevated by 4-8 
standard deviations in that period.  
Page 9 of 47 Swiss Political Science Review
10 
 
Finally, an unrelated scandal during this period involved President Bachelet’s daughter-in-
law, Natalia Compagnon. She was found to have used classified information and political 
influence to benefit Caval, a real estate firm of which she was half-owner. Normalized search 
activity for “caval” increased in the first week of January 2015 7-9 standard deviations. 
According to Google Correlate, “compagnon” was the search term most highly correlated with 
“caval” over the duration of the case (here delineated from January 4, 2015 to April 19, 2015). In 
relative terms, then, these cases piqued Chileans’ interest as much as, if not more, than global 
and hemispheric soccer championships in featuring some of Chile’s strongest sides in recent 
history. 
As this evidence attests, we fielded our study amidst a crisis of representation in which 
politicians from all major parties, both congressional chambers, and the executive had violated 
laws meant to separate politicians from the undue influence. Broad swaths of the public called 
for President Michelle Bachelet faced calls to step down. Presumably only the wide-reaching 
nature of the scandal, and widespread lack of legitimacy in all actors, forestalled impeachment 
proceeding. For her part, Roxana Miranda kept a relatively low profile during the political crisis. 
She confined herself largely to criticizing incumbents, big business, and banks on Twitter rather 
than taking to the airwaves or newspapers. Partido Igualdad was one of the few political parties 
unscathed by the scandals. The Chilean public, however, did not forget Miranda or her campaign 
message. In fact, during the outbreak and immediate aftermath of these scandals, normalized 
search activity on www.google.cl for “candidata roxana miranda” spiked 10 standard deviations 
in four different weeks, including the first three weeks of April.  
In sum, when our study was conducted in April 2015 the conditions theorized to help 
populist messages resonate with voters were present in Chile. Theoretically, hearing Miranda’s 
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populist message in the midst of a corruption scandal of breadth and gravity without precedent in 
Chile’s post-authoritarian era should encourage voters to view the political establishment as a 
conspiratorial clique pitted against the will of the people and, in turn, to support Miranda. Our 
study, therefore, features a real populist conveying an extremely populist message to voters in a 
context ripe for populism (Rovira Kaltwasser 2015; Rovira Kaltwasser and Hawkins 2016).  
 
Experimental Design 
We recruited 605 Chilean subjects from an invitation-only online panel managed by Netquest, a 
Spanish marketing firm, to form a quota sample representative of Chile’s voting-age population 
in terms of gender, age, and region.
  
In order to achieve a sample size with sufficient statistical 
power to find significant results if there were any to be found, we conducted a power analysis. 
Since the only experimental work manipulating populism we could find is Bos et al. (2013), we 
reviewed effect sizes in the following studies of candidate traits: Aguilar et al. (2015a, 2015b), 
Conroy-Krutz et al. (2016), and Terkildsen (1993). To compute the necessary number of cases, 
we relied on a statistical tool developed at the University of Dusseldorf, G Power (Faul et al. 
2007). Our calculations, displayed in Appendix Figure A1, revealed that we would need 290 
subjects in the sample to recover the average effect size across these studies (d = 0.33) (Cohen 
1988).
4
 Thus, the number of subjects per condition to 302 is warranted on the following grounds. 
First, since Roxana Miranda fared so poorly in the 2013 election, the effect of the discourse on 
vote intentions might be far weaker than those observed in previous studies. Second, we needed 
                                                           
4
 The calculation of the expected average effect is based on the mean effects and standard deviations of 
such effects found in the research mentioned above under a two-tail test. We graphically depict the ratio 
of sample size to effect size based on the expected average size effect in Appendix Figure A1. 
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additional statistical power to test secondary hypotheses reported elsewhere (Aguilar and Carlin 
2015) on the effects of individual traits on the willingness to vote for Miranda.   
Subjects were randomly assigned to view a one-minute video clip of Roxana Miranda 
delivering either a populist (177 words, 60 seconds) or a non-populist message (167 words, 51 
seconds) during a televised candidate debate hosted by the National Press Association. Sampling 
both video clips from this debate allows us to limit variation on context-specific elements – 
location, camera angles, dress, interlocutors, audience, etc. For our purposes, we refer to the 
subjects (n = 303) who viewed the populist message as the treatment group and those (n = 302) 
who view the non-populist message as the reference group.
5
 Spanish transcriptions of the videos 
are provided in the appendix, English translations are below. 
 
Populist Message Frame  
“I want to address my people. If God left us, or gifted us, the land, the cordillera, 
the fields, the fish and the fruits, the rivers, who gave authorization to five 
families to do or undo what they want with our rights? Who gave them permission 
to leave my unborn grandchildren nothing to eat? We are the ones who work. We 
are the ones who clean their toilets. We are the ones who are working in the 
mines. We are the ones who work for this country. How long will they trample 
us?  For the first time in Chile we have risen up from below, from all the public 
policies without common sense. For the first time a popular candidacy of the poor 
people, of the nobodies, of the landless, of the homeless, of the toothless, of my 
neighbors who clean toilets, of the thousands of Chileans who are trampled 
                                                           
5
 The randomization worked as both conditions are balanced on relevant sociodemographic 
characteristics: age, gender, and income.  
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underfoot. And do you think that I’m going to believe today that they are going to 
change my life? If they have never done it in history?” 
 
Non-Populist Message Frame 
“It is super simple to fix this. Look, I have here a tool [plastic pipe] that I brought 
to demonstrate this disposable system. This disposable system is plastic, 
disposable, it breaks. This contaminates. This [copper pipe] is what we need. This 
is ours. By recovering copper we are going to have free education, housing, health, 
and all the rights that have been privatized. Only with this. And this is what they 
are selling today. We have to buy, on top of all that, this pipe from abroad. It is 
simple what we are proposing. To recover our strategic resources is key. And not 
only in economics. We need to recover the communications media in order to 
educate our people. Today our people are dis-informed and that is why we have the 
reality of the regions, the impoverished regions. Look at Calama, I just traveled to 
Calama, where they extract the income of Chile, one of the most impoverished 
regions, the water contaminated for 40 years with arsenic.”   
 
The non-populist discourse does not contain the slightest hint of ideational populism. It 
proposes nationalizing the mining sector and links privatization to inequality and poverty in the 
northern regions of Chile. The populist message also harps on deep structural inequalities and 
class cleavages, but it qualifies as populist from an ideational perspective because it contains the 
three basic traits Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (forthcominga) identify: (1) it underscores elite 
intentionality for the crisis of representation; (2) it draws a Manichean contrast between a 
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corrupt, immoral elite and a pure, hardworking people; and (3) it employs emotional triggers, 
namely anger.  
Before going forward, let us consider an essential aspect of the analysis. The random 
assignment of subjects, which is crucial to establishing unit homogeneity, appears to have 
worked. As analyses in the appendix show, randomization produced excellent balance across the 
non-populist and populist conditions. There are no significant differences in pre-treatment 
variables across the two conditions. And after regressing the treatment assignment on all 
available covariates, a joint F-test suggests we can reject the hypothesis that they jointly predict 
treatment assignment. Satisfying these two conditions gives us greater confidence in our 
experimental set-up. 
 
Variables and Measurement 
Our analysis includes two related dependent variables as indicators of support for populist 
candidates. The first and most central gauges the probability of voting for Miranda in a 
hypothetical election held this week.
6
 Higher values on a 7-point Likert scale indicate a greater 
likelihood of voting for Miranda if an election were held next week. The second dependent 
variable reflects evaluations of Roxana Miranda as a leader. Subjects were asked, “How much do 
you agree or disagree with the following statement: Roxana Miranda is a good leader.”
7
 
Responses, also on a 7-point Likert scale, are recoded so that increasing values indicate 
increasing agreement. These variables allow us to test whether populist political discourse 
                                                           
6
 “Si esta semana fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales y Roxana Miranda estuviera compitiendo 
para la presidencia ¿qué tan probable sería que votara por ella? 1 = Nada Probable, 7 = Muy 
Probable.” 
7
 “¿Qué tan acuerdo o en desacuerdo está con la siguiente afirmación: Roxana Miranda es una buena 
líder? 1 = Muy de acuerdo, 7 = Muy en desacuerdo.” 
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directly affects subjects’ vote intentions and indirectly via their potential influence on 
perceptions of candidate character traits, a known predictor of vote choice (Alvarez 2010; 
Funk1999; Kinder 1986; Mattes et al. 1993). 
 
Results 
We first explore the relationship between populist discourse and both dependent variables 
graphically. Figure 2 shows no direct treatment effects of populist messages on vote intentions. 
The small difference (0.04, 7-point scale) is not statistically significant. The difference on 
Miranda’s leadership evaluations is larger and negative (-0.15, 7-point scale) but also 
indistinguishable from zero. We cannot reject the null hypothesis in either test.  
[Figure 2 here] 
For a second test, we turn to OLS regression analysis in Table 2. We explicitly model the 
treatment effects of viewing the populist message video on vote intentions for Miranda and 
evaluations of her as a leader, using robust standard errors. Results in Table 2 align with the 
graphic results. Model 1 finds no treatment effect of populist discourse on vote intentions for 
Miranda, though the coefficient is positively signed as expected. Model 2 also finds null results 
regarding subjects’ evaluations of Miranda as a good leader. Here again, as seen graphically, the 
coefficient bears a negative sign, contra expectations.  
Is it possible that treated subjects did not see Roxana Miranda as more populist than subjects 
in the non-populist condition? After all, many subjects – especially those who followed the 2014 
presidential campaigns – were likely exposed to something akin to our treatment at some point in 
recent memory. That is, they may know enough about Miranda’s candidacy to grasp the anti-elite 
essence of her populist message. In this sense, our treatment may be fighting an uphill battle to 
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make ideational populism salient. To test this possibility the following manipulation check was 
included at the end of the questionnaire: “To what extent would you say that Roxana Miranda’s 
message in the video was critical of the political elites of the country? 1 = Not at all, 7 = Very 
Much.”
8
 Table 2 analyzes how subjects in both groups answered this question. 
[Table 2 here] 
On average, subjects who viewed the populist message rated Roxana Miranda’s message 
more critical of Chile’s political elites than those who viewed the non-populist message. The 
difference of means between the treatment and control groups is 0.81. Put another way, subjects 
in the treatment group rated Miranda’s message 13.5% more anti-elite. A Student’s t-test finds 
this difference is extremely unlikely to be due to chance (p < 0.000). Thus, we can safely 
conclude that our treatment video indeed manipulated subjects to view Miranda as more anti-
elite – a key element of ideational populism – compared to subjects who watched her deliver a 
non-populist message. This evidence notwithstanding, we note that subjects in both groups 
scored Miranda high on anti-elitism. Whereas the treatment group gave her a mean rating of 6.29 
out of 7 and a median rating of 7, the control group’s mean rating was 5.48 with a median of 6. 
So, while we successfully moved subjects’ perceptions vis-à-vis the non-populist control group, 
prior exposure to Roxana Miranda’s populist message may have colored their perceptions 
somewhat.  
Taken together the results are puzzling from the perspective of the theory of ideational 
populism. We know the manipulation worked – subjects in the populist condition rated 
Miranda’s speech significantly harsher towards the political elite than subjects in the non-
populist condition – but somehow this populist message did not woo voters to Miranda or 
                                                           
8
 “¿Hasta qué punto diría usted que el mensaje de Roxana Miranda criticaba a las élites políticas del 
país? 1 = Nada, 7 = Mucho” 
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translate into better ratings of Miranda as a leader. Apparently, populists must move perceptions 
far more than our experiment did in order to create meaningful differences in voting intentions.  
 
Discussion 
Populism as a political discourse has a long history in the United States, Europe, and Latin 
America and has attracted significant scholarly attention of late (e.g., de la Torre and Arnson 
2013; Hawkins et al. forthcoming; Kriesi and Pappas 2015; Inglehart and Norris 2016; Weyland 
2001). In these same geographical contexts, scholars have made great strides towards fitting 
persuasive models of voter choice (Carlin, Singer and Zechmeister 2015; Lewis-Beck et al. 
2008; Thomassen 2006). But by and large these two literatures have run in parallel. Rigorous 
research linking populist rhetoric to voting behavior, therefore, remains in its infancy. 
Conceptual issues have slowed progress in this area. And while some scholars strive to rally a 
consensus around an ideational definition of populism (Hawkins et al. forthcoming; Hawkins and 
Rovira Kaltwassser forthcominga), few would disagree that it remains, in the words of Gallie 
(1956), an “essentially contested” concept that is often, in Sartori’s (1970) words “stretched” to 
apply to an unwieldy range of phenomena (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; Weyland 2001). 
Yet following salutary examples from the democratization literature (e.g. Coppedge, Alvarez and 
Maldonado 2008; Coppedge et al. 2011; Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Przeworski et al. 2000) we 
seek to advance the debate by defining our terms clearly, invoking an established theory, and 
testing some hypotheses we derive from it. 
Against this backdrop, the current study can only hope to make incremental progress towards 
answering the research question that motivates it: does ideational populist discourse raise support 
for the candidates who employ it? We took as our subject an actual candidate in the 2013 
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Chilean presidential election, Roxana Miranda, whose rhetoric rates as highly populist as any 
other candidate on record (Hawkins and Castanho Silva 2016). We locate our study in the midst 
of a crisis of representation in Chile brought on by a spate of corruption scandals implicating the 
entire political class. We present evidence that the Chilean public was aware of and scandalized 
by these events. Arguably, then, the populist discursive elements, the crisis conditions needed to 
make them credible, and an attentive public were present at the time of our study. Would they 
combine to spur support for the populist candidate?  
Our results suggest not. Of course a single case is not enough to disconfirm a theory. So in 
fairness to theorizing on ideational populism, and to the scientific enterprise more broadly, we 
must consider why our study failed to generate confirmatory evidence. Specifically, we must 
view our null results in relation to the relative strengths of case studies such as ours – to generate 
new hypotheses and to identify potential scope conditions (Gerring 2004) – in order to contribute 
to the lively debates highlighted in this special issue. To that end, we posit that factors including 
ideology, issue positions, strategic voting, gender, and previous knowledge of the candidate 
make the present case study an extremely hard test for the ideational theory of populism and 
represent productive avenues for future theoretical refinement. Let us consider them in turn. 
First, while Roxana Miranda fits the mold of recent ideational populists in Latin America, in 
Chile such rhetoric combined with a left-wing policy agenda may conjure up strong negative 
emotions for many voters. Chile’s most recent left-wing populist president, Salvador Allende, 
carried out land reform, anti-poverty and redistributive policies, and nationalized natural 
resources – the sorts of left-wing policies Miranda prescribes in the populist message above. 
Tragically, this pushed Chile past the brink; the economy tanked, democracy broke down, and a 
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brutal dictatorship reigned for seventeen years. In this sense, historical memory may hinder 
ideational populism. That is, we may be observing a “once bitten, twice shy” effect. 
Second, a mismatch of issue positions between the populist and the voters may similarly 
mute her appeal. Andreadis et al.’s recent observational study of the role of issue positions in 
voting for populists in comparative perspective concludes: “the credibility of populist rhetoric 
may be conditional upon voters agreeing with the populist party’s vision of what the general will 
wants at that time” (forthcoming:1). It is quite possible that Miranda’s issue positions were too 
extreme or out of step with a vast majority of Chilean voters. After democracy returned, 
according to Roberts (1998) the left “lost faith in the revolutionary teleology of classical 
socialism” (3) and “learned” to embrace more incremental social change. A democratic-
authoritarian cleavage was fashioned over the class cleavage as the axis of party competition 
(Bonilla et al. 2011; Torcal and Mainwaring 2003). Therefore, the failure of Miranda’s populist 
message, both in our study and in the 2013 elections, may owe to incongruity between her issue 
stances and those of most voters. 
Thirdly, gender may be factor. Is there something about women populist leaders that 
damages their appeal? To the extent that attitudes concerning traditional gender roles overlap 
with ideology and political culture, this is a distinct possibility (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 
2015). A partial, but straightforward test of this hypothesis would have been possible at the time 
we fielded our experiment. Speeches by another candidate in the 2013 presidential race, Marco 
Enríquez Ominami, register moderate levels of populist rhetoric (Hawkins and Castanho Silva 
2016). We could have compared treatment effects across the two candidates who differ chiefly in 
gender. Though a leftist in his 2009 bid for the presidency (Bunker and Navia 2013), Enríquez 
Ominami’s increasingly centrist positions may have confounded such an analysis by 2013, and 
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his subsequent indictment for violating campaign finance laws would clearly preclude such an 
analysis now. Replicating the analysis in additional case studies of women populist candidates, 
or cross-case comparisons matching other women populist candidates with men populist 
candidates who are alike on all other relevant traits represent fruitful ways to explore this 
hypothesis. 
Another reason why populist discourse may have failed to generate support for the populist 
candidate in our experiment may have to do with strategic considerations. Since individuals are 
loathe to waste their votes, they tend to abandon their true preferences for long-shot candidates 
and, instead, vote for a candidate with a better chance of winning (Cox 1997). Since few 
Chileans would have given Miranda good odds of winning, even those who may have liked her 
message might not be willing to vote for her. History supports this view. Before running for 
president in 2013, Roxana Miranda had competed twice in municipal elections and once in a 
parliamentary election. She was most competitive in her first contest for mayor of San Bernardo 
in 2008, winning 4.24% of the vote. Although the ballotage system governing presidential 
elections allows voters to be more expressive and less strategic in the first round, the plurality 
system of the 2008 mayoral election did not. Thus, when we asked subjects about the probability 
of voting for Miranda for president they might have rejected it out of hand as a wasted vote. If 
this is correct it suggests, following Cox (1997), that if Miranda had gained more popular 
support and media coverage after the 2013 presidential election, citizens might have perceived 
her as a more viable candidate. This, in turn, might have generate results in line with the 
ideational theory.  
Finally, as mentioned before, participants in our study had knowledge of Miranda’s critical 
stance against the elite. This previous knowledge might have influenced participants’ responses 
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in the control condition making it harder for us to find a discernible treatment effects. The main 
advantage of using real candidates in experimental research is greater external validity. But, in 
some instances, the trade-off with internal validity might be substantial, as prior knowledge of 
such politicians might affect non-treated participants’ responses. As such, our study provides a 
potentially important methodological take-away for scholars keen to introduce “realism” into 
their experimental protocols on populism. Whether research designs like ours generate such 
effects is an issue we hope future studies can resolve. 
In conclusion, the results of this case study are intriguing. But like any good case study, it 
creates many questions that it cannot, on its own, resolve. For instance, it identifies some 
potential scope conditions of the ideational theory of populism. As such, we underscore that our 
work has the potential to be theory-generating and, thus, shape the questions that will guide 
future scholarly investigations. Collectively, such research will inch us ever closer to 
understanding the psychological microfoundations of the demand side of populism. 
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Table 1.  Effects of Populist Discourse on Miranda Vote Intentions and Leadership 
Evaluations 
 Model 1  
(Vote Intention) 
Model 2  
(Leadership Evaluation) 
Populist Discourse 0.051 
(0.252) 
-0.131 
(0.179) 
   
Constant 2.753
* 
(0.122) 
3.592
* 
(0.144) 
N 605 605 
R
2
 0.000 0.001 
Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* 
p <0.05 (two-tailed) 
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Table 2. Manipulation Check: Difference of Means with Student’s t-Test 
 Treatment 
(n = 303) 
Control 
(n = 302) 
   
Mean 
(s.e.) 
6.29 
(0.08) 
5.48 
(0.10) 
   
Difference 
(s.e.) 
0.81 
(0.12) 
 
   
t(d.o.f.)  6.34 (603)   
Ha: difference < 0 p = 1.000  
Ha: difference = 0 p = 0.000  
Ha: difference > 0 p = 0.000  
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Appendix 
 
Transcripts of the Videos in Spanish: 
 
Non-Populist Message Frame 
Es súper simple resolver esto. Mire yo tengo aquí una herramienta que traje para demostrar este 
sistema desechable. Este sistema desechable, es plástico, desechable, se rompe. Esto es 
contaminante. Esto es lo que nosotros necesitamos. Esto es nuestro. Recuperando el cobre vamos 
a tener educación gratuita, vivienda, salud y todos los derechos que han sido privatizados. Sólo 
con esto. Y esto hoy en día lo están vendiendo. Tenemos que comprar, más encima, esta cañería 
en el extranjero. Es simple lo que nosotros estamos planteando. Recuperar los recursos 
estratégicos es clave. Y no solamente es lo económico. Necesitamos recuperar los medios de 
comunicación para educar a nuestro pueblo. Hoy en día nuestro pueblo está desinformado y por 
eso es que tenemos la realidad de las regiones, las regiones empobrecidas. Mira Calama, yo 
acabo de viajar a Calama, donde se saca el sueldo de Chile, una de las regiones más 
empobrecidas, el agua contaminada hace 40 años con arsénico.     
 
Populist Message Frame 
Quiero dirigirme a mi pueblo: Si Dios nos dejó o nos donó la tierra, la cordillera, los campos, los 
peces y las frutas, los ríos ¿Quién les dio autorización a cinco familias para que hicieran y 
deshicieran con nuestro derecho? ¿Quién les dio permiso para dejar a mis nietos no nacidos sin 
comida? Somos nosotros los que trabajamos. Somos nosotras las que les hacemos el aseo. Somos 
nosotros los que estamos en la minera. Somos nosotros los que trabajamos por este país. ¿Hasta 
cuándo nos pisotean? Por primera vez en Chile nos hemos levantado desde abajo, desde todas 
sus políticas públicas sin sentido común. Por primera vez, una candidatura popular del pueblo 
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pobre, de los nunca, de los nadie, de los sin tierra, de los sin casa, de los sin diente, de mis 
vecinas que hacen aseo, de los miles de chilenos que estamos pisoteados. Y ¿ustedes creen que 
yo les voy a creer hoy día que van a cambiar la vida mía? Si no lo han hecho por historia.  
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[Figure A1 here] 
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Table A1 
Descriptive Statistics (Pre-Treatment Variables), Full Sample 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Err. 
Gender  605 1.512 0.020 
Age  605 38.937 0.553 
Region  605 9.424 0.152 
Marital Status 575 2.113 0.063 
Number of Children 340 2.394 0.063 
Education 575 2.833 0.047 
Income 347 6.190 0.148 
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Table A2. Randomization Check: Differences among Subjects in Experimental Conditions 
(Pre-Treatment Variables) 
Variable Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F-stat P value 
Gender      
Between groups 0.000 1 0.000 0.00 0.966 
Within groups 151.156 603 0.250   
Total 151.157 604 0.250   
Age      
Between groups 137.038 1 137.038 0.74 0.389 
Within groups 111618.575 603 185.105   
Total 111755.613 604 185.025   
Region      
Between groups 12.388 1 12.388 0.88 0.347 
Within groups 8461.439 603 14.032   
Total 8473.828 604 14.029   
Marital status      
Between groups 0.206 1 0.206 0.09 0.766 
Within groups 1335.446 573 2.330   
Total 1335.652 574 2.326   
Number of Children      
Between groups 3.244 1 3.244 2.39 0.122 
Within groups 457.943 338 1.354   
Total 461.188 339 1.360   
Education      
Between groups 0.854 1 0.854 0.66 0.417 
Within groups 745.117 573 1.300   
Total 745.972 574 1.299   
Income      
Between groups 1.686 1 1.686 0.22 0.638 
Within groups 2637.760 345 7.645   
Total 2639.446 346 7.628   
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Table A3. Regression and Joint F Test for Randomization and Balance (Pre-Treatment Co-
variates) 
Co-variates Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Woman -0.027 0.074 -0.36 0.718 -0.172 0.119 
Central Region -0.047 0.090 -0.52 0.601 -0.225 0.131 
Southern Region -0.054 0.102 -0.52 0.602 -0.255 0.149 
Married 0.024 0.097 0.25 0.806 -0.168 0.216 
Divorced 0.156 0.193 0.81 0.421 -0.225 0.537 
Separated -0.122 0.202 -0.60 0.548 -0.519 0.276 
Widowed 0.064 0.177 0.36 0.717 -0.284 0.413 
Unión Libre 0.051 0.135 0.38 0.707 -0.215 0.317 
Number of Children 0.030 0.031 0.95 0.342 -0.032 0.091 
Education -0.013 0.029 -0.43 0.666 -0.071 0.045 
Income 0.007 0.016 0.47 0.640 -0.024 0.038 
Constant 1.466 0.185 7.91 0.000 1.100 1.831 
N 216      
F (11, 204) 0.420      
Prob > F 0.947      
R
2
 0.022      
Adjusted R
2
 -0.031      
MSE 0.508      
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Figure 1. Experimental Context: Public Mood, Perceptions of Corruption and 
Political Trust  
 
 
Source: Centro de Estudios Públicos. 
Note: Sampling error for both surveys is +/– 3% at the 95% confidence level. 
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Figure 2. Treatment Effects of Populist Discourse on the Likelihood of Voting for 
Miranda and Evaluation of Miranda as a Leader 
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Figure A1. Power Analysis: Ratio of Sample Size to Power by Effect Size Calculated 
 
 
 
Note: graph showing power calculations for the required sample size based on a difference 
of means test of two independent means (t-test) under a two-tail significance text. The 
graph depicts the sample size required for different levels of power based on the expected 
size effect.  
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Appendix 
 
Transcripts of the Videos in Spanish: 
 
Non-Populist Message Frame 
Es súper simple resolver esto. Mire yo tengo aquí una herramienta que traje para demostrar 
este sistema desechable. Este sistema desechable, es plástico, desechable, se rompe. Esto es 
contaminante. Esto es lo que nosotros necesitamos. Esto es nuestro. Recuperando el cobre 
vamos a tener educación gratuita, vivienda, salud y todos los derechos que han sido 
privatizados. Sólo con esto. Y esto hoy en día lo están vendiendo. Tenemos que comprar, 
más encima, esta cañería en el extranjero. Es simple lo que nosotros estamos planteando. 
Recuperar los recursos estratégicos es clave. Y no solamente es lo económico. Necesitamos 
recuperar los medios de comunicación para educar a nuestro pueblo. Hoy en día nuestro 
pueblo está desinformado y por eso es que tenemos la realidad de las regiones, las regiones 
empobrecidas. Mira Calama, yo acabo de viajar a Calama, donde se saca el sueldo de Chile, 
una de las regiones más empobrecidas, el agua contaminada hace 40 años con arsénico.     
 
Populist Message Frame 
Quiero dirigirme a mi pueblo: Si Dios nos dejó o nos donó la tierra, la cordillera, los 
campos, los peces y las frutas, los ríos ¿Quién les dio autorización a cinco familias para que 
hicieran y deshicieran con nuestro derecho? ¿Quién les dio permiso para dejar a mis nietos 
no nacidos sin comida? Somos nosotros los que trabajamos. Somos nosotras las que les 
hacemos el aseo. Somos nosotros los que estamos en la minera. Somos nosotros los que 
trabajamos por este país. ¿Hasta cuándo nos pisotean? Por primera vez en Chile nos hemos 
levantado desde abajo, desde todas sus políticas públicas sin sentido común. Por primera 
vez, una candidatura popular del pueblo pobre, de los nunca, de los nadie, de los sin tierra, 
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de los sin casa, de los sin diente, de mis vecinas que hacen aseo, de los miles de chilenos 
que estamos pisoteados. Y ¿ustedes creen que yo les voy a creer hoy día que van a cambiar 
la vida mía? Si no lo han hecho por historia.  
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Table A1 
Differences among Subjects in Experimental Conditions  
 
Variable N Mean Std. Err. 
Gender  605 1.512 0.020 
Age  605 38.937 0.553 
Region  605 9.424 0.152 
Marital Status 575 2.113 0.063 
Number of Children 340 2.394 0.063 
Education 575 2.833 0.047 
Income 347 6.190 0.148 
 
 
Variable Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F-stat P value 
Gender      
Between groups 0.000 1 0.000 0.00 0.966 
Within groups 151.156 603 0.250   
Total 151.157 604 0.250   
Age      
Between groups 137.038 1 137.038 0.74 0.389 
Within groups 111618.575 603 185.105   
Total 111755.613 604 185.025   
Region      
Between groups 12.388 1 12.388 0.88 0.347 
Within groups 8461.439 603 14.032   
Total 8473.828 604 14.029   
Marital status      
Between groups 0.206 1 0.206 0.09 0.766 
Within groups 1335.446 573 2.330   
Total 1335.652 574 2.326   
Number of Children      
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Between groups 3.244 1 3.244 2.39 0.122 
Within groups 457.943 338 1.354   
Total 461.188 339 1.360   
Education      
Between groups 0.854 1 0.854 0.66 0.417 
Within groups 745.117 573 1.300   
Total 745.972 574 1.299   
Income      
Between groups 1.686 1 1.686 0.22 0.638 
Within groups 2637.760 345 7.645   
Total 2639.446 346 7.628   
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Table A2 
Regression and Joint F Test for Randomization and Balance (All Pre-Treatment 
Variables) 
Column1 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Woman -0.02670 0.07382 -0.36 0.718 -0.1722717 0.118819 
Central Region -0.04730 0.09037 -0.52 0.601 -0.2254736 0.130874 
Southern Region -0.05350 0.10244 -0.52 0.602 -0.2554557 0.148508 
Married 0.02402 0.09744 0.25 0.806 -0.1681056 0.21614 
Divorced 0.15588 0.19335 0.81 0.421 -0.2253415 0.537096 
Separated -0.12150 0.20179 -0.60 0.548 -0.5193914 0.276313 
Widowed 0.06425 0.17675 0.36 0.717 -0.2842391 0.412736 
Unión Libre 0.05073 0.13498 0.38 0.707 -0.2153992 0.316865 
Number of Children 0.02975 0.03121 0.95 0.342 -0.0317793 0.091282 
Education -0.01270 0.02946 -0.43 0.666 -0.0708291 0.045342 
Income 0.00732 0.01566 0.47 0.640 -0.023548 0.038197 
Constant 1.46551 0.18521 7.91 0.000 1.100334 1.830684 
N 216      
F (11, 204) 0.4200      
Prob > F 0.9474      
R
2
 0.0220      
Adjusted R
2
 -0.0307      
MSE 0.5083      
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Figure 1. Experimental Context: Public Mood, Perceptions of Corruption and Political 
Trust  
 
 
Source: Centro de Estudios Públicos (2014, 2015). 
Note: Sampling error for both surveys is +/– 3% at the 95% confidence level. 
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Figure 2. Treatment Effects of Populist Discourse on the Likelihood of Voting for 
Miranda and Evaluation of Miranda as a Leader 
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Figure A1. Power Analysis: Ratio of Sample Size to Power by Effect Size Calculated 
 
 
 
Note: graph showing power calculations for the required sample size based on a difference 
of means test of two independent means (t-test) under a two-tail significance text. The 
graph depicts the sample size required for different levels of power based on the expected 
size effect.  
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